

**STRATEGY
RESEARCH
PROJECT**

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**MENTORSHIP
THE NEED FOR A FORMAL PROGRAM**

BY

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THE NEED FOR A FORMAL PROGRAM

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ABSTRACT

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The study of mentoring is very important for the Army as it continues with transformation to a twenty-first century force. Soldiers have always been our credentials and the Army must keep the focus on them by ensuring that they are properly trained and equipped. Some believe that part of the training model involves mentoring and a strong formal mentorship program.

In this fast pace environment sometimes leaders find themselves engaged in a selfish agenda, leaving it to others to mold junior leaders. By acting in this manner, leaders often leave subordinates thirsting for information and knowledge. In the case of mentoring, the Army has exacerbated the problem. It references mentoring and mentorship in its leadership manuals but will not establish a structured mentorship program for all to participate in. The Army has yet to realize that formal mentoring to all subordinates can represent the difference between success and failure, both on and off the battlefield. Additionally, the Army should recognize that both mentors and protégés receive benefits from the mentoring relationship. Mentoring is not a one way street, learning occurs continuously for the mentor and the protégé.

Junior officers and NCOs should not struggle to learn their roles or understand their organizations without the aid, guidance, and teaching of senior mentors. There are formal mentoring programs ongoing in the DoD, and more specifically within the Army. However, the Army has not sanctioned any formal mentoring programs. The question becomes, how long will the Army continue to run its ad hoc mentorship program without mentoring to all, who benefits from this ad hoc program, and how long can the senior leadership run from establishing a structured program so all may benefit?

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MENTORSHIP: THE NEED FOR A FORMAL PROGRAM

Inherent in existing Army leadership doctrine is the assertion that senior leaders should become mentors. Army Field Manual 22-100 states, "One of the most important duties of all direct, organizational, and strategic leaders is to develop subordinates."¹ The concept of mentorship requires the participation of two parties, the mentor and the protégé. Junior officers and noncommissioned officers increasingly expect mentorship, while senior officers have the responsibility to provide it. Despite the expectations of both parties, we might ask whether the Army really has a mentorship program at all. If it did, we should be able to identify who is in charge of it, who evaluates its effectiveness, and who determines what the process means to the participants. In this paper, I assert that there are two fundamental models of mentorship. The current state of mentorship in the Army is represented by an informal model, whereby participation is the result of an informal agreement between participants, and without specific guidance as to process or outcomes. The lack of structure results in a host of problems including the exclusion of some personnel that would otherwise benefit from mentoring relationships, inconsistent application across the organization, and confusion about the roles of mentors and protégés. Although an informal process may be acceptable in some types of organizations, the inequities alone make it an unsuitable model for the Army. In this paper I assert that a second model, one of a formalized and structured mentorship program is more appropriate and identify a number of examples currently underway within the Department of Defense that serve as improvements over the current state of mentorship in the Army.

Although mentorship, as used today, describes many different types of relationships, it originates from ancient Greek mythology. In The Odyssey, Athena, the goddess of war and wisdom provided advice to Telemachus while disguised as the old man Mentor.² Mentor taught and guided Telemachus during Odysseus' ten-year absence. The concept of mentoring was developed based on this epic character. The concept denotes the passage of wisdom from older, more experienced members of society to a youthful, but receptive, protégé.

Army field manual FM 22-100 provides the following definition: "Mentoring is the proactive development of each subordinate through observing, assessing, coaching, teaching, developmental counseling, and evaluating that results in people being treated with fairness and equality"³. Margo Murray states that mentoring is, "a deliberate pairing of a more skilled or experienced person with a lesser skilled or experienced one, with the agreed upon goal of having the lesser skilled person grow and develop specific competencies."⁴ Michael Zey defines a mentor as "a person who oversees the career and development of another person, usually a

junior, through teaching, counseling, providing psychological support, protecting, and at times promoting or sponsoring.”⁵ General John A. Wickham states, “Mentoring is simply giving of your knowledge to other people and to be an effective mentor, you need the experience and wisdom of your years, and one vital quality – you have to care.”⁶ These definitions emphasize fairness, equal opportunity, and inclusion. They see mentorship as something every subordinate ought to expect from every leader, yet it is questionable whether this definition accurately describes mentoring in its current state. It is highly questionable whether all subordinates receive the same dosage of proactive and personal leadership development.

Colonel Thomas Kolditz, Professor of Behavioral Science and Leadership at the United States Military Academy, offers a different view. To Kolditz, “a mentor is a senior person with whom you have had an intensive and lasting developmental relationship. A mentor relationship goes beyond a typical senior-subordinate relationship in that it is both professional in focus, yet personal in tone.”⁷ Clearly, to Kolditz, the mentorship relationship is a special one, based on professional development, but of a personal nature. The personal aspect of the relationship necessitates an informal approach and virtually assures that some will receive the benefits of mentoring while others do not.

Whether you use the Greek, Army, or other professional definitions of mentorship, all have a common theme. The central elements include the receipt of information through the experiences of others that have the ability and willingness to share them with younger, inspired individuals with the thirst and hunger for knowledge. The mentor provides advice and constructive criticism, working to maximize protégé strengths and minimize weaknesses. Most of this is accomplished through sharing experiences, but the heart of the relationship comes from frank and honest discussions and observations. The mentor lets the protégé see how he leads and provides insights into his observations. The relationship should be without fear, meaning that the protégé is free to discuss concerns or issues openly without fear that the relationship will end due to the nature of the information.

SUCCESSFUL MENTORING PROGRAMS

Elements of an effective mentorship program would include a strategy that stipulates the objectives sought and the procedures used for implementation. The lack of a clear expression of such elements significantly inhibits the effectiveness of the Army’s current mentorship efforts. A successful mentorship program is dependant on a number of key factors.

The mentoring program should provide a benefit to every junior officer and noncommissioned officer. This can only be accomplished through a deliberate and systematic

delivery process with a clearly defined vision, mission, purpose and objective. The difference between expectation and reality can damage morale. When Army field manuals clearly state that all should receive the benefits of mentoring, but not all do, the result is lip service and mistrust. A system that provides mentorship to a chosen few leads to an unequal playing field that is an affront to democratic principles of equity as well as Army values. Formal procedures for recruiting, matching or linking, supporting and evaluating the mentor/protégé relationship are key to program success. The Army should endeavor to ingrain support for the program at every level of the organization. Procedures should clearly indicate the process for establishing and terminating the relationship.

To ensure the success of a mentorship program it is important to consider the needs of both the mentor and the protégé. We tend to regard the relationship from the perspective of the protégé without considering the mentor. Protégés are interested in becoming successful in a demanding profession. They seek knowledge that will advance their careers and make them more effective professionals. The needs of mentors must be also be considered. If not, they may become frustrated with the program and will not participate effectively. The needs of mentors can be facilitated through mentor training, by detailing the expectations and benefits of participation, by providing problem solving support, and by rewarding good mentorship practice. Time spent together should be valuable to both parties based on a relationship of mutual respect and regard. Since the support of senior leaders is crucial, in order to facilitate acceptance, the Army should seek the participation of senior leaders in developing the program before implementation. It is my belief that senior military officers, like their civilian counterparts, want to contribute to the growth and development of others. There are intangible rewards in regenerating themselves in others and in contributing to the future of a profession in which they have invested a lifetime.

An effective mentorship program is not an endeavor to be undertaken lightly. The mentor must have the motivation and experience to guide the protégé. It is important to note that being an Army officer does not automatically qualify one as a leader or one that can provide the guidance needed to be a mentor. The relationship will take time to develop, probably extending beyond the timeframe of a single assignment. Kolditz is correct in noting the special relationship that develops between mentor and protégé. The trick for the Army is in ensuring that these beneficial relationships are available to all. Knouse & Webb note a number of challenges unique to the military in establishing effective mentoring programs. They specifically noted that the high turnover rate mitigates against the establishment of long-term relationships

causing the early termination of promising associations. They also describe the unique challenges of providing culturally specific mentoring in a highly diverse population.

In the civilian world, mentorship programs involve training sessions for both mentor and protégé. The Army falls short on this point. Currently, there is no structured mentorship training in existence. The Army apparently assumes that mentorship relationships will develop based on principles of leadership contained in FM 22-100. Other authors note that there is widespread confusion and concern about mentorship. Colonel Peter Varlien states "Army doctrine has inadvertently shown confusion and misunderstanding into the discussion of mentorship."⁸ He recommends the Army do away with the mentor label all together and focus on educating leaders. Additionally, Colonel Kolditz believes that the classical definition of mentorship in the Army has created a false expectation within the junior officer ranks. A training program for mentors and protégés would go a long way eliminating confusion and ensuring equitable implementation.

A mentoring program, properly conducted, can be an effective instrument in influencing organizational climate and culture. According to Edgar H. Schein, "This process of building culture occurs in three ways: (1) the entrepreneurs only hire and keep subordinates who think and feel the way they do, (2) they indoctrinate and socialize subordinates to their way of thinking and feeling, and (3) their own behavior is a role model that encourages subordinates to identify with them and thereby internalize their beliefs values, and assumptions."⁹ The mentoring program can be an aid to the socialization process and it can facilitate the role modeling process. The mentoring program can be an asset to the socialization process and it can facilitate the role modeling process. According to Schein, "If an organization is going to continue to be successful, it must grow in size and age, forcing leaders to consider how to evolve processes that worked on a small scale and with young people into processes that work on a global scale with maturing members – a totally different leadership task."¹⁰ An effective mentoring program provided to all leaders can greatly enhance efforts for the development of the next generation of future leaders who must possess the necessary skills and traits to ensure the Army's continued success.

EXAMPLES OF SUCCESSFUL FORMAL MENTORING PROGRAMS

Not all organizations follow the informal model of mentoring currently pursued by the Army. The Department of Defense Leadership and Management Program (DLAMP), and the installation-level program underway at Fort Detrick, Maryland provide two formal program alternatives worthy of consideration. Examination of these programs provides models that the

Army could adopt on a broader scale. Both programs include procedures that ensure mentoring is available to all. Lieutenant General Walter F. Ulmer suggests a third type of formal program and although it is not currently in operation, it is worthy of consideration.

The Department of Defense DLAMP program represents a formal mentorship program designed to enhance participants' leadership skills and competencies through structured objectives. Mentors volunteer to participate in the program by filling out a participant agreement form. On the form, the mentor provides career information that would be of interest to a DLAMP participant and potential protégé who is looking for a mentor. A coordinator creates a database used to match protégés to mentors.

"The key requirement of the DLAMP mentorship program is that each protégé develop a formal mentoring relationship."¹¹ Unlike the Army system where responsibilities of the participants are unstated, the DLAMP program defines the selection process, and stipulates the responsibilities of both the mentor and the protégé. The protégé must seek out a mentor within certain constraints. The mentor must be in the Department of Defense and must be at least two grades higher than the protégé. Additionally, the mentor must be at least a third level supervisor. The relationship between mentor and protégé is formalized through a mentor agreement. The protégé has primary responsibility for completing the program requirements while the mentor is to provide guidance throughout the protégé's career.

The relationship between the mentor and the protégé is based on joint responsibility. The DLAMP mentoring program specifies that both parties are to discuss and agree on expectations and parameters of the relationship. They jointly develop realistic goals facilitated by the preparation of an Individual Development Plan along with periodic performance assessments. The protégé has the responsibility to establish clear communications in order to obtain maximum benefit from the mentor's knowledge, experience, and guidance. It is the protégé's responsibility to initiate a free flowing and open-ended communication with the mentor. This process is a significant departure from the Army's current approach that is unspecific about roles, but appears to place primary responsibility on the mentor. The result for the Army is that there are protégés who expect mentoring, but are not cognizant of their part in initiating the relationship, and mentors who are willing to serve and expect to be approached, but are not. In the DLAMP program much depends on the mutual understanding of the goals, missions, objectives, and requirements of the program. When faced with questions or difficulties both the mentor and protégé have access to DLAMP administrators who are very knowledgeable about the mentorship program. This technical information chain also serves as the method of officially terminating the relationship.

DLAMP mentors are expected to act as unbiased advisors that provide counseling, coaching, and guidance to the participants. Mentors help the protégé understand the goals and objectives of the program and provide valuable insights into the workings of the organization. They have an important role in building trust that is essential to success of the mentorship program. They assist the protégés in development of the Individual Development Plan. The signature of the mentor on the Individual Development Plan certifies it as a form of contract between both parties. It then serves as a yardstick for measuring success.

DLAMP mentors suggest various seminars, courses, and other opportunities the protégé should attend in order to develop them for future leadership positions. The mentor also discusses rotational assignment options with the protégé. To facilitate this purpose the protégé completes a rotational evaluation form that is filed with the protégé's supervisor. The form ensures that the work team understands the goals of rotational assignments and obtains agreement that the participant will move between duty positions in order to gain a wider variety of experiences. The goal is to develop well-rounded leaders. The DLAMP mentor periodically reviews the progress of the protégé against the development plan and provides both oral and written evaluations to the protégé.

FORT DETRICK MENTORING PROGRAM

Fort Detrick, Maryland introduced a formal mentoring program that provides developmental opportunities for all assigned personnel. It is also designed to expand protégés professional horizons and leadership skills by linking participants to senior mentors. Although the program is less structured than the DLAMP program, the fundamentals, strategy, and end state are much the same. "There is a formal mentoring coordinator who matches mentors and protégé; assists in facilitating training and evaluation sessions; and formally tracks the success of the program. Protégés may select mentors from an automated mentor profile listed on a web site or they can talk to the mentoring program coordinator."¹² The protégés can repeat this process until they feel comfortable with their choice.

The Fort Detrick method involves a four-phase process. The introductory phase allows both parties to become familiar with each other by sharing background, personal qualifications, and experiences. It is in this phase that the participants develop trust and candor. Phase two is the developmental phase where the ground rules are outlined between the two parties. They discuss logistical issues of where to meet; how they will interact; and they formalize developmental plans, goals, and objectives. During phase three the mentor enacts the development plan. He systematically prioritizes objectives for increasing the protégé's skills,

knowledge and abilities for professional growth. Periodically the mentor adjusts the developmental plan to ensure the goals focused and appropriate for the protégé. Finally, there is a post-development phase where the mentor and protégé agree that there is little more to be gained from the relationship resulting in a formal discontinuance of the process. Although this is the termination cycle of the process, it often leads to the development of new mentor relationships.

The Fort Detrick program relies on a program coordinator who administers the mentoring program and provides expertise to the participants. The coordinator has a role in matching protégé's to mentors and officially records both initiation and termination of mentor/protégé relationships. The program coordinator can assist in finding a new mentor when relationships are terminated. An on-line automated mentor profile makes the process relatively easy to administer.

Within the Fort Detrick program, the protégé requirements are simply stated. Program participants must be willing to learn and accept coaching, teaching, and counseling from their mentor. They are required to develop a plan for accomplishing career goals and objectives resulting in the understanding that participants are responsible for managing their own careers. Protégés gauge the time and extent of interaction needed with the mentor to ensure their skills and abilities are honed for success.

The Fort Detrick mentor responsibilities include understanding the purpose and intent of the mentorship program as well as an in-depth knowledge and understanding of the organization, its mission, and daily operations. The mentor is expected to have a long-range perspective. The mentor should be supportive and responsive to the protégé. The mentor is expected to examine the protégé's skill level, needs of the organization, and the demands of the protégé's career field. Armed with such knowledge the mentor can skillfully chart a course for the protégé's development plan. Finally, the mentor allows time and opportunity for the protégé to achieve established goals and objectives on a timetable appropriate to the protégé. As in the DLAMP program, the mentor must be at least two grades higher than the protégé and should not be in his direct chain of command. This represents another departure from the Army program that infers mentoring is a subset of good supervisory leadership. The Army approach to mentoring infers that it is an inherent part of what every soldier can expect from their immediate supervisor. By extending the mentor/protégé relationship outside of the chain of command, the DLAMP and Fort Detrick programs ensure that mentoring remains separate from supervisory authority or direction.

GENERAL ULMER'S SUGGESTION

Walter F. Ulmer, Jr., writing on leadership into the 21st century, observes that, "adjustments on how to learn on the job should come from feedback through two sources, a formal mentoring program and a supplement to the Officer Evaluation Report."¹³ His vision provides a third model for a formal mentoring program. He recommends that each field grade and general officer should be required to select two formal protégés. He also recommends that the specifics of mentoring should be broadly defined, and it should be the responsibility of the professional education system to teach the selection and roles of mentors along with techniques of providing behavioral feedback. Ulmer also thinks that mentors could be active or retired military, or civilians. The essential requirement is that they have great leadership qualities. By extending mentorship beyond the chain of command protégés can receive intimate, non-threatening feedback, and a degree of confidentiality and outspokenness that the chain of command simply cannot.¹⁴

A formal program, whether it is on the model of DLAMP, Fort Detrick, or as suggested by Ulmer, provides participants with a greater understanding of the Army and their role in it. They begin to understand what it takes to be successful in their career field. Without mentoring, they are at a disadvantage. Michael Zey states, "Since the unmentored manager does not have a senior executive showing him the ropes and explaining how to advance, he often leaves the organization in search of career success."¹⁵

THE CASE FOR A FORMAL MENTORING PROGRAM

The Army cannot afford the departure of talented young officers and NCOs due to a lack of mentoring. In 1992 the General Accounting Office identified the need to meet recruiting goals and cut attrition as a major performance and accountability challenge facing the Department of Defense.¹⁶ The GAO report noted that it is becoming harder for the services to meet recruiting goals despite increases in resources devoted to recruiting. This is occurring at a time when the services are experiencing historically high levels of attrition that reached 36.8% in 1995. GAO recommended long-term approaches to address human capital issues. Additional emphasis on mentoring through a formalized program represents one of the means to achieve this goal.

The Army is in the midst of a personnel crisis as it tries to keep young Captains and Majors in the force structure. Although the high attrition rate of mid-grade officers is a complex issue, part of the problem is a lack of mentorship. A number of senior leaders are of the opinion that lack of leadership is part of the problem and mentorship will provide part of the solution. General John Keane, Vice Chief of Staff of the Army indicated that the "quality of leadership- as

reflected in the mentoring process has fallen off..." He also stated, "We're just not taking the time that we need to spend with our youngsters and their personal growth and development. We need to do more of that."¹⁷ In light of Keane's statement the Army should reevaluate its current guidance on mentoring and mentorship and establish a program with specific guidelines and metrics similar to those established by DLAMP and Fort Detrick. FM 22-100 states, "At the organizational level, commanders ensure that systems and conditions are in place for the mentoring of all organizational members."¹⁸ Such sweeping guidance is insufficient for a unit commander with four years of experience who may never have personally experienced a mentoring relationship. The result is a commander tasked to implement a program he does not understand without skills to mentor and guide subordinates. The situation is a normal occurrence in the Army and little is being done to correct the problem.

According to Colonel Joseph LeBoeuf, a development expert at the United States Military Academy, "The big issue in the retention area is the mentoring issue, although it is embedded in a larger context of overall officer development."¹⁹ In this statement lies a key point. The Army has so many subsystems connected to other programs that it is hard to separate the wheat from the chaff. In other words, mentoring is so imbedded in ill-defined and poorly understood concepts of officer development that it has little chance of success. Mentoring and mentorship is relegated to a few obscure chapters in the Army's leadership manual, FM 22-100. If the Army is going to be serious about mentorship, there should be a manual dedicated solely to the program instead of relying on disparate sources.

Absent a formal program, there is no information on how many of its senior and junior officers and noncommissioned officers are participating in mentorship activities. The Army currently relies on the Officer Evaluation Report (OER), and the Noncommissioned Officer Evaluation Report (NCOER) to track the performance of its leaders. This system puts the supervisor in the counselor, if not the mentor, role. A similar form for tracking mentorship program participation could bolster the program and provide information necessary to track participation. On the other hand, there appears to be little enthusiasm for such an initiative. After posing the concept to a number of senior leaders, the most consistent response was that "it would just be another layer of bureaucratic red tape the leadership would have to deal with."²⁰ Most feel that it is already difficult enough to administer the current OER/NCOER system, and are reticent to sign up for requirements to complete additional forms.

A formal process is necessary to ensure that all who might benefit from mentoring relationships actually have the opportunity. Just because FM 22-100 says that it should be done, does not ensure that it will be. The current level of understanding about mentoring is

hopelessly disparate. Many officers do not understand what it entails, nor have they experienced effective mentoring, and they have received no training on how to be a good mentor. Without experience, the concepts in the field manual are abstract and subject to wide interpretation.

ALTERNATIVE VIEWS ON MENTORSHIP

In a recent Army War College Strategic Research paper, Colonel Peter Varljen recommended that the Army exclude the mentor label altogether and focus on educating leaders so they are better able to develop subordinates through effective coaching, teaching and role modeling.²¹ He asserts that if leaders perform these tasks effectively, a long-term voluntary personal and professional relationship is likely to result. The theory posits that subordinates receiving such effective leadership will want to maintain the relationship after they depart from the chain of command. He argues that positive mentoring relationships are the outgrowth of basic leadership functions.

Varljen's perspective has much in common with the current approach to mentoring, whereby mentor-protégé relationships form haphazardly, developing from effective teaching, coaching, and counseling relationships embedded in the chain of command. The hope is that such relationships will foster long-term growth as professionals and as people. However, it is an unfortunate fact that all leaders are not effective mentors. When leaders are not effective at coaching, teaching, and role modeling, there is little reason for the protégé to stay in contact. Varlen's recommendation lacks the checks and balances necessary to ensure that there is a workable mentorship relationship for all. Some are fortunate enough to have a truly outstanding leader who is also an effective mentor while others are not so fortunate. The unfortunate ones are the have-nots who lack a mechanism for establishing contact with a mentor outside of the chain of command.

Varljen's recommendation reflects concerns expressed by Army leaders during the writing of FM 22-100. One senior leader involved with writing the current version of the field manual believes that the notion of voluntary, unofficial mentoring relationships initially alarmed some leaders at the highest level of the Army.²² The prospect raised concerns that promoting long-term voluntary relationships would be in direct conflict with some of the Army's most cherished values. They were concerned that the mention of mentorship in official doctrine might undermine the foundation for equal opportunity and fairness for all.²³ This perspective illustrated a lack of faith in the ability of the organization to foster mentorship in an even-handed manner. Surely, the leadership would be called to task for implementing the program to some

over others, especially if inequities were observable on the basis of race or gender. There is empirical evidence that the concerns voice by senior leaders during the writing of FM 22-100 were prophetic and that uneven application of mentorship is the current state.

Knouse and Webb observe that white men and socioeconomically advantaged people are more apt to be mentored than other groups while networks for women and minorities tend to be smaller and less stable than those among white males.²⁴ They also note that some researchers suggest that formal mentoring programs are the only way to ensure equal opportunity for all employees. Complicating the problem, they assert, is the fact that there are relatively few women and minorities serving in senior leadership positions. Women and minorities therefore have difficulty establishing effective mentoring relationships in an unstructured system. They also argue that women and minorities have unique issues to overcome based on under representation and stereotyping that makes mentoring of particular benefit to them. Knouse and Webb point out an additional set of unique barriers to women in establishing mentoring relationships. They observe that women are less likely to initiate mentoring relationships with men, and that men may be reluctant to accept such relationships for fear that they might be accused of improper conduct.²⁵ The result is that some get mentoring and others do not. It is a process that serves to maintain advantages for one segment of the population while denying others. The Army, with its haphazard approach to mentoring has therefore created a false expectation among junior officers and has departed from the classical notion embedded in Kolditz's definition.

The Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff Personnel (ODCSPER) total active Army racial statistical data further illustrates the need for an Army formalized program to support all personnel and specifically minorities. The following tables indicate that the Army loses half of its black Captains prior to making the grade of Major, and half of the Majors are not promoted to Lieutenant Colonel, and only about one third of the Lieutenant Colonels become Colonels. This trend holds true for Hispanics, American Indian/Alaskan Natives and Asian/Pacific Islanders. This is not only true for males but is also true for females. The statistical trends seem to stay fairly consistent through the Warrant Officer ranks from CW3 through CW5, and also into the enlisted ranks from E6 to E9.

RACIAL STATISTICAL BY REDCAT AND GRADE UNCLASSIFIED

Part 1 – TOTAL ACTIVE ARMY²⁶

RCS: DCSPER-441 PCN: ZKI-041
QTR ENDING SEP 97

		White Not Hispanic		Black Not Hispanic		Hispanic		Amer Indian/ Alaskan Native		Asian/Pacific Islander		Other Unknown		OPMD Managed		Spec Br Managed		
Grade	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	Total No.	No.	%	No.	%	
GO	279	90.00	27	8.71	2	0.65	0	0.00	2	0.65	0	0.00	310	285	91.94	25	8.06	
COL	3240	89.11	227	6.24	53	1.46	11	0.30	73	2.01	32	0.88	3636	2310	63.53	1326	36.47	
LTC	7634	83.88	887	9.75	253	2.78	43	0.47	167	1.83	117	1.29	9101	6531	71.76	2570	28.24	
MAJ	10699	80.80	1620	12.23	387	2.92	66	0.50	251	1.90	219	1.65	13242	9271	70.01	3971	29.99	
CPT	18460	78.79	2800	11.95	889	3.79	125	0.53	764	3.26	391	1.67	23429	16902	72.14	6527	27.86	
1LT	6955	79.18	918	10.45	372	4.23	43	0.49	350	3.98	146	1.66	8784	7190	81.85	1594	18.15	
2LT	7303	79.20	962	10.43	378	4.10	47	0.51	409	4.44	122	1.32	9221	7684	83.33	1537	16.67	
TOTAL	54570	80.58	7441	10.99	2334	3.45	335	0.49	2016	2.98	1027	1.52	67723	50173	74.09	17550	25.91	
CW5	312	89.14	27	7.71	5	1.43	0	0.00	3	0.86	3	0.86	350					
CW4	1079	82.68	131	10.04	41	3.14	13	1.00	17	1.30	24	1.84	1305					
CW3	2366	77.09	394	12.84	142	4.63	23	0.75	52	1.69	92	3.00	3069					
CW2	3915	74.73	767	14.64	261	4.98	31	0.59	113	2.16	152	2.90	5239					
CW1	1155	64.63	405	22.66	81	4.53	8	0.45	43	2.41	95	5.32	1787					
TOTAL	8827	75.12	1724	14.67	530	4.51	75	0.64	228	1.94	366	3.11	11750					
E9	1790	56.29	1018	32.01	160	5.03	17	0.53	83	2.61	112	3.52	3180					
E8	5349	49.48	3932	36.37	744	6.88	50	0.46	239	2.21	497	4.60	10811					
E7	18636	48.32	14494	37.58	2684	6.96	230	0.60	771	2.00	1755	4.55	38570					
E6	28627	48.45	22644	38.32	3408	5.77	365	0.62	1258	2.13	2785	4.71	59087					
E5	42926	55.75	24522	31.85	4006	5.20	463	0.60	1729	2.25	3354	4.36	77000					
E4	61163	60.93	25618	25.52	6908	6.88	721	0.72	2768	2.76	3212	3.20	100390					
E3	34428	61.03	14002	24.82	4691	8.32	478	0.85	1540	2.73	1277	2.26	56416					
E2	21300	61.05	8543	24.49	3242	9.29	314	0.90	879	2.52	610	1.75	34888					
E1	17466	62.39	6540	23.36	2746	9.81	247	0.88	639	2.28	359	1.28	27997					
TOTAL	231685	56.74	121313	29.71	28589	7.00	2885	0.71	9906	2.43	13961	3.42	408339					
TOTAL	ARMY	295082	60.49	130478	26.75	31453	6.45	3295	0.68	12150	2.49	15354	3.15	487812				

NOTE: Due to Rounding, Percentage May Not Add to 100%
1/LESS THAN 0.05%

UNCLASSIFIED
RACIAL STATISTICAL BY REDCAT AND GRADE
Part 2 – TOTAL WOMEN IN THE ACTIVE ARMY
RCS: DCSPER-441 **PCN: ZKI-041** **QTR ENDING SEP 97**

Grade	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	Total No.	No.	%	No.	%	Spec Br Managed
GO	4	80.00	1	20.00	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00	5	3	60.00	2	40.00	
COL	199	79.28	22	8.76	6	2.39	1	0.40	15	5.98	8	3.19	251	60	23.90	191
LTC	720	75.00	162	16.88	26	2.71	6	0.63	23	2.40	23	2.40	960	406	42.29	554
MAJ	1265	70.16	392	21.74	68	3.77	6	0.33	41	2.27	31	1.72	1803	792	43.93	1011
CPT	2352	67.61	744	21.39	142	4.08	20	0.57	147	4.23	74	2.13	3479	1657	47.63	1822
1LT	1080	69.41	284	18.25	62	3.98	8	0.51	83	5.33	39	2.51	1556	859	55.21	697
2LT	1114	69.76	294	18.41	66	4.13	8	0.50	81	5.07	34	2.13	1597	1004	62.87	593
TOTAL	6734	69.78	1899	19.68	370	3.83	49	0.51	390	4.04	209	2.17	9651	4781	49.54	4870
CW5	2	100.00	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00	2			
CW4	25	89.29	2	7.14	0	0.00	1	3.57	0	0.00	0	0.00	28			
CW3	88	61.97	36	25.35	6	4.23	1	0.70	5	3.52	6	4.23	142			
CW2	202	55.04	128	34.88	16	4.36	1	0.27	9	2.45	11	3.00	367			
CW1	79	39.70	90	49.25	5	2.51	1	0.50	7	3.52	9	4.52	199			
TOTAL	396	53.66	264	35.77	27	3.66	4	0.54	21	2.85	26	3.52	738			
E9	62	42.47	71	48.63	6	4.11	2	1.37	1	0.68	4	2.74	146			
E8	405	39.94	512	50.49	37	3.65	4	0.39	20	1.97	36	3.55	1014			
E7	1306	29.37	2682	60.32	190	4.27	30	0.67	77	1.73	161	3.62	4446			
E6	1840	26.21	4482	63.86	249	3.55	49	0.70	134	1.91	265	3.78	7019			
E5	3664	33.95	5745	53.23	512	4.74	87	0.81	307	2.84	477	4.42	10792			
E4	7442	43.30	7396	43.04	1049	6.10	180	1.05	523	3.04	596	3.47	17186			
E3	4470	45.34	4048	41.06	742	7.53	90	0.91	281	2.85	227	2.30	9858			
E2	3368	50.11	2421	36.02	548	8.15	83	1.23	194	2.89	107	1.59	6721			
E1	2493	53.42	1561	33.45	396	8.49	52	1.11	105	2.25	60	1.29	4667			
TOTAL	25050	40.50	28918	46.76	3729	6.03	577	0.93	1642	2.65	1933	3.13	61849			
FEMALE	32180	44.55	31081	43.03	4126	5.71	630	0.87	2053	2.84	2168	3.00	72238			
MALE	262902	89.09	99397	76.18	27327	86.88	2665	80.88	10097	83.10	13186	85.88	415574	85.19		
FEMALE	82180	10.91	31081	23.82	4126	13.12	630	19.12	2053	16.90	2168	14.12	72238	14.81		

NOTE: Due to Rounding, Percentage May Not Add to 100% 1/LESS THAN 0.05%

Obviously, there are a number of factors that impact the percentages by category. The question is, would a healthy mentorship program help heal these disturbing percentages? The answer is yes, provided the program is available for every soldier regardless of rank if the individual decides he wants to participate in the process. All personnel must have this option to keep the playing field level.

Is there empirical evidence that formal mentorship programs are more effective in establishing long-term relationships? Kolditz finds spotty evidence to support the notion. Despite the best efforts of DLAMP and Fort Detrick to match mentors and protégés, Kolditz asserts that such programs are deficient precisely because of the rules used to pair mentors and protégés.²⁷ As the matching and pairing is never consistent because it is dependant on the mentor's and protégé's individual background and what they bring to the program. This is part of the human chemistry that people look for in a relationship and all too often this process can not be forced upon two individuals. It just happens. Kolditz is skeptical about the prospects for success of a formal mentorship program because central to the concept is that the developmental relationship be a voluntary one.

RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

Mentoring can be an effective tool in the development of junior officers and noncommissioned officers. This research indicates that a mentoring relationship provides benefits to the protégé, the mentor, and the organization. Mentoring facilitates the inculcation of professional norms. It suggests that mentoring helps the protégé overcome some of the negative impacts of being new or junior in an organization and has positive benefits for the mentor. The organization benefits from reduced turnover and more capable protégés. The responsibility for development of subordinates extends to all senior members of the profession. Positive experiences for protégés can have long-term positive ramifications. I can attest to the sense of satisfaction gained from reaching out and mentoring those who would not otherwise have the opportunity.

Junior officers who lack a mentoring relationship are at a disadvantage in that they do not have access to an important informational resource. Those without access to the advice and counsel of more experienced officers are a step behind those that do. It is entirely possible that some of the mid-grade officers and noncommissioned officers that are currently departing the Army would remain if they had effective mentoring. Knouse & Webb cite research that confirms a number of advantages to those involved in mentoring relationships including higher

job satisfaction, better opportunities for advancement, higher income, and greater career satisfaction.²⁸

In order to establish and effective program, the Army must first clearly define mentoring or mentorship. It should be explicitly defined as something other than a subset of leadership and counseling. Although they are closely related, they are not the same. The Army must examine the best mentorship practices of the corporate world as well as within the Department of Defense. There are some good concepts and programs already in use that could be adopted by the Army. The DLAMP and Fort Detrick programs are examples of structured programs that are growing in size and importance. The Army must also establish clear guidelines and procedures for the mentor and protégé to follow. The program and process must be structured to ensure that all service members have the opportunity to enjoy the benefits of mentorship. Moreover, taking General Ulmer's suggestion, the Army should track and administer the program much like the OER system currently is. The tracking system provides the means by which the Army levels the mentoring playing field and ensures that no one is left out of the mentorship loop. The DLAMP approach has much to recommend it as a model whereby mentors are linked to protégés and progress is tracked until the relationship is terminated.

In order to facilitate successful implementation of an invigorated mentorship program, the Army must ensure that its junior and senior leadership is involved in the process. The success of the program will depend on the commitment of all sectors of the Army. It will take commitment to ensure that all receive the benefits of mentoring to avoid some of the pitfalls existent in the current counseling process. As Lieutenant General Theodore G. Stroup observes, "Despite our best intentions and belief in mentoring, 85 percent of lieutenants report that they receive support from counseling less than one week before the OER is due."²⁹ Clearly, it will take more than another form to make the program work. Establishing parameters and procedures would be an improvement over the current informal approach, but buy-in is also essential.

It is important to the profession that we encourage leader development and role modeling as we groom future Army leaders. Don Snider said it best to the West Point Class of 2000:

As a lieutenant, I was selected to be an aide to our new brigade commander, a new brigadier general just arriving in Okinawa. At one of our first meeting, I asked him what my duties were. Mind you, he was a WWII and Korean War veteran with six Silver Stars and five Purple Hearts; he had fought from Omaha Beach to the Ruhr and for two years in Korea. His answer was profound. First, let me tell you what my duty is. It is always to conduct myself so that every officer in this brigade wants to be like me and ultimately, to be in my position.

And your responsibility lieutenant, is to tell me whenever any lieutenant or captain sees that I am not doing that. You see, this remarkable officer knew what it takes to earn the trust of subordinates, whether officer to officer or officer to enlisted. The key is to model, "24/7," individual competence and professionalism, and to accept that responsibility as your daily duty. Of course, your soldiers will listen politely to what you have to say, but they take their real cue as to your trustworthiness from your actions. Thus the keys to creating the necessary trust are: competence and humbleness modeled through absolutely consistent leadership by example.³⁰

I would offer two points here. The first is that Snider was providing a model that established expectations about mentoring among those future officers whether he knew it or not. He spoke of professionalism, leadership by example, and the importance of trust. His story describes a senior leader who was willing to take the time to explain to a young lieutenant their respective roles. In Snider's story it happened to be a relationship that existed within the chain of command, but I doubt it would have had less impact had it come from a senior leader from a different unit. It obviously had a lifelong impact on Snider because he was able to recall every word that his brigade commander articulated. The second point is that most junior officers have a strong desire to learn from senior leaders. Snider's speech was widely circulated by electronic mail throughout the Army. A formalized mentoring process with clear objectives and procedures can help fulfill such expectation of junior leaders. Through a structured program, they will become more aware of their job, better understand the requirements of their profession, be better prepared to accept future challenges, and become more aware of their potential to better serve the Army.

Mentorship programs, with the right strategy, properly structured, well-defined and professionally administered, are the best means to facilitate equitable professional development for all. The bottom line is that a formal mentoring program must be available to all personnel within the Army, and the program must include legitimate checks to ensure all personnel have unfettered access. Without controls provided by a formalized program mentorship is analogous to having unmonitored standards. If the standards are not checked by unit leaders, the standards will surely fall.

WORD COUNT = 7,026

ENDNOTES

¹ Department of the Army, Army Leadership, Field Manual 22-100 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, 31 August 1999), 5-16.

² Major General Kenneth A. Jolemore, "The Mentor: More Than A Teacher, More Than A Coach," Military Review (7 July 1986): 6-7.

³ Department of the Army, Army Leadership, Field Manual 22-100 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, 31 August 1999), 5-16.

⁴ Margo Murray and Marna A. Owen, Beyond the Myths and Magic of Mentoring (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1991), xiv.

⁵ Micheal G. Zey, The Mentor Connection (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1991), 7.

⁶ John A. Wickham, Jr., "Collected Works of the Thirtieth Chief of Staff, United States Army, 1983-1987," available from <http://call.army.mil/csa/wickham.html>; Internet; accessed 16 December 2001.

⁷ Taken from the US Military Academy (USMA) Survey Instrument on Mentorship 2000 as provided by Colonel Thomas Kolditz, Professor of Behavioral Science and Leadership at USMA.

⁸ Department of the Army, Army Leadership, Field Manual 22-100 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, 31 August 1999), 5-16.

⁹ Edgar H. Schein, Leadership and Organizational Culture (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1992).

¹⁰ Ibid., 111.

¹¹ DoD Defense Leadership and Management Program; available from <http://www.cpmss.osd.mil/dlamp/mentoring.html>; Internet; accessed 20 January 2000.

¹² Fort Detrick Mentoring Program; Mentoring Profiles; available from <http://www.armymedicine.army.mil/detrick/dctee/mentor/profile.cfm>; Internet; accessed 14 December 2001.

¹³ Walter F. Ulmer, Joseph J. Collins and T.O. Jacobs, American Military Culture in the 21st Century (Washington, D.C.: The CSIS Press, February 2000).

¹⁴ Remo Butler, "Why Black Officers Fail," Parameters 29 (Autumn 1999): 99-107.

¹⁵ Micheal G. Zey, The Mentor Connection (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1991), 7.

¹⁶ General Accounting Office, Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of Defense (Washington, D.C.: U.S. General Accounting Office, January 2001), 23-29.

¹⁷ Sean D. Naylor, "Keane Blames Leadership for Junior Officer Exodus," Army Times, 25 December 2000, p. 10.

¹⁸ Department of the Army, Army Leadership, Field Manual 22-100 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, 31 August 1999), 5-16.

¹⁹ Joseph LeBoeuf LJ4657@exmail.usma.army.mil, "Thank you," electronic mail message to Matthew Hall Matthew.Hale@carlisle.army.mil. 20 December 2000.

²⁰ Based on conversations with USAWC students between August and December 2001.

²¹ Department of the Army, Army Leadership, Field Manual 22-100 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, 31 August 1999), paragraph 5-85, p. 5-16.

²² Colonel Gregg F. Martin, "Mentorship: Meaningful Leadership Concept, Confusing Cliché or Euphemism for Favoritism," Course 1 Strategic Leadership Selected Readings Vol 1, (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2002).

²³ Remo Butler, "Why Black Officers Fail," Parameters 29 (Autumn 1999): 99-107.

²⁴ Stephen B. Knouse and Schuyler C Webb, "Mentors, Mentor Substitutes, or Vitural Mentors: Alternative Mentoring Approaches for the Military," in Mickey R. Dansby, James B. Stewart and Schuyler C. Webb (Eds) Managing Diversity in the Military. (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 2001), 150-151.

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, "Racial Statistics by Redcat and Grade." Available from <http://www.odcsper.army.mil/Directories/hr/demographics/DCSPER-441.txt>. Internet. Accessed 16 January 2002.

²⁷ Colonel Gregg F. Martin, "Mentorship: Meaningful Leadership Concept, Confusing Cliché or Euphemism for Favoritism," Course 1 Strategic Leadership Selected Readings Vol 1, (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2002).

²⁸ Knouse and Webb, Managing Diversity in the Military, 147.

²⁹ Lieutenant General Theodore G. Stroup, Jr., "Leadership and Organizational Culture," Military Review (January-February 1996): 44-49.

³⁰ Don M. Snider, "100th Night Banquet for the Class of 2000," Assembly (July-August 2000): 9-9.

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